Fatals claim barred by lifetime settlement
Ritchie v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2026] EWCC 50
Introduction
Ritchie v Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust [2026] EWCC 50 concerned the effect of a lifetime settlement on a subsequent claim under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (‘FAA’) against a concurrent tortfeasor.
HHJ Grimshaw granted summary judgment to the Defendant, holding that the Deceased’s earlier settlement with the manufacturer of a contaminated heater cooler unit (‘the Company’) had provided full satisfaction for the harm arising from his Mycobacterium Chimaera (‘MC’) infection. Applying Thompson v Arnold [2007] EWHC 1875 (QB) (‘Thompson’), and the principles concerning full satisfaction in Jameson & Anr v Central Electricity Generating Board [2001] 1 A.C. 455 and Heaton and Others v AXA Equity & Law Assurance Society PLC and Others [2002] 2 AC 329, the Judge concluded that the Deceased could not have maintained an action against the Defendant at the time of his death. The statutory condition in s1(1) FAA was therefore not satisfied, and the Claimant’s FAA claim could not succeed.
Background
The Deceased, Mr Ritchie, contracted MC mitral valve endocarditis from a contaminated heater cooler unit used by the Defendant during a heart valve repair at the Defendant’s hospital on 12 March 2015. He became symptomatic in 2018 and deteriorated further between 2020 and 2021.
Following a diagnosis of MC infection in July 2021, the Deceased commenced a product liability claim against the Company. In May 2022, a Schedule of Loss was served by the Deceased’s solicitors on the Company, which included a lost years claim on the basis that his life expectancy had been reduced by seven years. [7] – [8]. The total claimed was valued at £346,963.79.
Following negotiations, the claim settled for £250,000. A settlement agreement was entered into on 16 August 2022. The agreement explicitly included a clause releasing the Company from any fatal accident claims [21]:
“This agreement is in full and final settlement of, and Mr Ritchie, hereby releases and forever discharges, all and/or any actions, claims, […] that Mr Ritchie, may have or hereafter can, shall or may have against [the Company] […] in respect of any monies, damages, losses, liabilities, interest, costs or any other relief of whatever nature and however arising, directly or indirectly, arising out of or connected with the infection, the Claim or the underlying facts relating to the infection or the Claim including without limiting the generality of the forgoing any claim under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 [‘LRMPA’)], the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 or otherwise”.
Mr Ritchie died in October 2022, approximately two months after the settlement.
An inquest into his death was held in October 2023. It was the Claimant’s case that she first became aware during the inquest process of alleged failings in the care provided by the Defendant. Following the inquest, the Deceased’s solicitors wrote to the Defendant alleging failures on behalf of the Defendant and its clinicians [12].
In October 2025, the Claimant issued proceedings seeking bereavement damages and damages for financial dependency [16].
The Defendant had maintained in pre-action correspondence that the settlement agreement constituted a full and final resolution of the consequences of the infection and prevented the Claimant from bringing any further claim [14] – [15]. Following issue, the Defendant applied for strike out and/or summary judgment.
The Issues
HHJ Grimshaw identified three central issues [22]:
1. “Do existing legal authorities prevent the Claimant from recovering any losses under the [FAA] in this case given the ‘in life’ settlement reached between the Deceased and the Company?
2. Whether the Settlement Agreement constituted full satisfaction of the harm caused by the MC infection and linked to that issue, whether the damage sought in the present claim is the same as the damage compensated in the earlier claim?
3. If the Claimant cannot recover damages in this case, is it appropriate to dispose of the case summarily and, if so, is the correct approach to strike the claim out or to enter summary judgment?”.
The Law
HHJ Grimshaw reviewed the relevant authorities in detail. [23] – [50] provide a useful summary of the interaction between s1(1) FAA, concurrent tortfeasor principles and the doctrine of full satisfaction.
Particular attention was paid to Thompson, where Langstaff J observed at [5]:
“It ought to have been well known by any reasonable proficient personal injury practitioner that case law (Read v Great Eastern Railway (1868) LR 3 QB 555) had established […] that where a claimant pursued to judgment or settlement a claim for damages for an injury which subsequently proved fatal their dependants could have no right of action under the [FAA]”.
The Claimant accepted that, in order to satisfy s1(1) FAA, the Deceased must have been entitled to maintain an action against the Defendant immediately before his death [52].
The Decision
Issue 1: Do authorities prevent the Claimant from recovering any losses under the FAA given the ‘in life’ settlement agreement?
The Defendant relied on Thompson, arguing that as the Deceased had settled a claim for damages for an injury which later proved fatal, his dependants were also precluded from bringing a subsequent FAA claim. The Defendant also relied on Heaton, submitting that as the Deceased had obtained “full satisfaction of the harm” tortiously done to him, his loss had been extinguished, along with further claims for the same damage.
The Claimant argued that the Court should adopt a “broad-brush approach” to s1(1) FAA [52]. If any uncompensated loss remained, however small, the Deceased would still have been able to maintain an action immediately before death; there is no threshold as to how valuable a claim needs to be for s1(1) FAA to be satisfied. She further submitted that Thompson and Read had been wrongly decided [53].
The Judge considered himself boundby Thompson, Jameson and Heaton. He stated that there was “very good reason why, where a claimant settles a case ‘in life’ their dependants should not be entitled to pursue a further claim after they have died” [55], and approved of the “reasoning and logic” in Thompson. Any argument that Thompson and Read had been wrongly decided was not a matter for him [56].
Drawing the authorities together, the Judge extracted the following principles [57]:
· Settlement with one tortfeasor does not automatically release another concurrent tortfeasor from liability;
· However, it may do so if the claimant achieves “full satisfaction of the tort against the first tortfeasor”;
· Full satisfaction is not synonymous with full value (a settlement may satisfy a tort even if it is not for the full value of a claim);
· Accordingly, a court must consider the construction of a settlement agreement in its proper factual context;
· The court should not undertake a detailed valuation exercise comparing the settlement sum with the theoretical value of all potential claims.
The Judge concluded that a dependant is prevented from pursuing an FAA claim where the deceased settled during his lifetime in respect of the same damage, “unless the claimant did not receive full satisfaction of their claim by that in life settlement” [59].
In obiter observations, the judge noted that the Claimant’s proposed approach could generate significant satellite litigation. If an alleged shortfall in one settlement permitted further proceedings against another tortfeasor, similar arguments could potentially be repeated following successive settlements, undermining the principle of finality [58].
Issue 2: Did the settlement agreement constitute full satisfaction?
The Defendant submitted that the settlement agreement constituted full satisfaction for the Deceased’s loss [60]. The agreement was expressed to be in “full and final settlement” and encompassed the same losses that formed the basis of the present claim. The express references to the FAA and LRMPA further demonstrated that the settlement “was entered into […] in contemplation of death” and “was intended to compensate for the losses that could have been claimed under those statutes”[60].
The Claimant argued that the settlement was intended to achieve “just some” satisfaction and represented only partial recovery. It had been reached at an early stage, without expert evidence or proper pleadings. She further argued that even a minimal uncompensated loss (such as £1) would suffice to satisfy s1(1) FAA. She also submitted that her right to obtain full satisfaction of her loss (such as a bereavement award) could not be extinguished by an agreement to which she was not party.
The Judge concluded that the Deceased had obtained full satisfaction of the tort within his lifetime. He would not have been able to maintain an action against the Defendant during his lifetime, as any further action would have sought compensation for losses which had already been compensated, leading to impermissible double recovery. Accordingly, the Claimant could not bring a claim for further losses under s1(1) FAA [69].
In reaching that conclusion, the Judge emphasised that the ‘full satisfaction’ inquiry was not a “forensic exercise in counting pounds and pence” [64]. The inclusion of a lost years claim in the Schedule of Loss, together with the settlement agreement clause excluding any further claim under the FAA or LRMPA, indicated that the Deceased “appreciated that no further claim could be advanced against the Company once he had died, suggesting that it was intended that the ‘in life’ settlement would compensate him for all of his losses”. The fact that the settlement figure was lower than the sum claimed in the Schedule of Loss did not prevent it from constituting full satisfaction: “just because the Deceased’s claim was pleaded at a certain figure, that figure does not necessarily determine what full satisfaction of the claim could be”. A settlement involves compromise on both sides and may nevertheless amount to full satisfaction even where it is less than the full value of the claim [68].
Issue 3: Strike out or summary judgment?
The Judge considered that the statement of case “disclosed a cause of action recognised in law and a reasonable ground for bringing the claim if [the Claimant’s] case about full satisfaction was correct”and therefore should not be struck out. However, because the Deceased had received full satisfaction and could not have maintained an action at the time of his death, the Claimant had no reasonable prospects of succeeding. Therefore, the more appropriate route was to enter summary judgment and dismiss the claim [73].
Comment
This case is significant for practitioners advising seriously or terminally ill claimants, particularly where there may be more than one tortfeasor. It illustrates the importance of strategically considering potential causes of action and tortfeasors before settling a lifetime personal injury claim. It also underlines the importance of careful settlement strategy and drafting where death is foreseeable.
HHJ Grimshaw provided a useful reminder at [55] that practitioners advising seriously ill clients must consider whether a claim is better pursued during life or after death. The quantification of a claim may be higher post-death, but that will not invariably be so. Equally, “a claimant may gain the satisfaction of settling their claim in life, or they may wish to have their damages so that they can use the money before they pass away”. Further, Ritchie makes clear that these routes may not be cumulative. Where a claimant has settled in life for full satisfaction of the relevant harm, the Deceased cannot leave open a subsequent FAA claim in respect of that same harm.
Significantly, Ritchie reinforces the idea that whether a settlement constitutes full satisfaction is ordinarily determined by construing the settlement agreement in its factual context, rather than by conducting a retrospective valuation of what the Deceased might have recovered at trial and assessing if he had been under-compensated.
The FAA
The Claimant advanced a number of broader arguments about the fairness of the statutory scheme. She argued that s1(1) FAA is “unfair and unjust” and “too broad in its drafting as it captures two distinct types of loss firstly, losses in relation to dependency and secondly losses in relation to bereavement”. Whilst dependency losses may overlap with losses compensated through a lost years claim, there is “no mechanism for the relevant dependant to recover anything for their bereavement”. This drafting “flaw” runs contrary to Parliament’s intention that bereavement damages should generally be recoverable. In short, dependents ought to be able to bring their own claims, which should not depend on litigation decisions made by the deceased during life [53(i)].
The Claimant also argued that, having not been a party to the settlement agreement and apparently having had no knowledge of its terms, she should not be deprived of her entitlement to bereavement damages because of an agreement made by someone else [53(ii)].
However, though the Judge considered these arguments to be “academically interesting”, he, perhaps unsurprisingly, did not consider them, concluding that it was not a matter for him [56]. The judgment therefore does not resolve the Claimant’s argument concerning whether a dependant’s separate bereavement entitlement can properly be extinguished by a Deceased’s lifetime settlement.
Procedural Position
The procedural approach taken by the Judge is also of interest. HHJ Grimshaw concluded that the Claimant’s statement of case disclosed a valid cause of action recognised in law and therefore declined to strike out the claim. However, having determined that the Deceased had received “full satisfaction of his claim”, he concluded that an “essential element of the cause of action [was] missing” and that the Claimant had no reasonable prospect of success. Summary judgment was therefore the appropriate means of disposing of the claim [73].
This raises an interesting question as to the precise characterisation of the requirement in s1(1) FAA that the deceased must have been entitled to maintain an action and recover damages had he survived. One might consider that this should not merely be regarded as an ‘element’ of the dependant’s statutory cause of action, the absence of which renders the claim incapable of succeeding, but instead that the absence of that requirement means that no cause of action under s1(1) ever arose in the first place. The point was not explored in the judgment, but may be of practical significance, given the differing costs consequences of strike out and summary judgment.
